11. Details are provided below, but to anticipate, cf. Long 1996a, who argues strongly for a link between Socratic and Cynic ethics, using as evidence the controversy in the Stoa over the unorthodox teachings of Aristo, who rejected the Stoic theory of "preferred indifferents." According to Long, "rather than calling Aristo a Cynicising Stoic, it would be better. .. to regard him as a Stoic who thought that the Cynic tradition of Socrates was truer to the spirit of the philosopher than tendencies which Zeno was initiating" (p. 23). In Hellenistic philosophy, therefore, we have evidence of a debate over the legacy of Socrates' ethical teachings.
12. Giannantoni 1990b has come down on the side of those who deny the Antisthenes-Diogenes link in the Cynic succession. He argues: 1) Aristotle speaks about Antistheneioi but not about kunikoi; "the Dog" refers not to Antisthenes but to Diogenes; 2) The two Cynic contemporaries of Diogenes, Crates and Onesicritus, speak about Diogenes but they are in manifest ignorance of Antisthenes. According to Giannantoni, it is only in the accounts of authors who are very late, such as Epictetus, Dio Chrysostom, and Aelian, that one finds a connection between Antisthenes and Diogenes.
13. Caizzi 1996, 99, clarifies the structure of this refutation in her incisive commentary: "Oppure si tratta di quella che Aristotele chiama la fallacia secondo l'accidente: se X e diverso da Y, e Y ha la proprieta accidentale di essere padre, X e diverso dal padre, dunque non e padre. Above I suggested that some of the obscure references in the Euthydemus might be better understood if the reader keeps in mind the translation of fourth-century issues to a fifth-century setting. Hence the epithet daaTcOp, "fatherless," could signal difficulties with the writing, or literary portrayal, of Socrates.17 That is, the literary representation "Socrates" is necessarily "fatherless," because it is bereft of the historical Socrates.18 By allowing that Socrates has become a logos whose meaning is under dispute within the various Sokratikoi Logoi, the Euthydemus opens up a conversation about the philosophical lineage of the Socratic movement.
The connections between the philosophy of Socrates19 and the philosophy of the Cynics, reflected in their mutual distrust of doxa, chremata, and epideixis (intellectual exhibitionism), are well known.20 In the Euthydemus, as I will argue, Plato juxtaposes what are arguably Cynic tenets or at least tendencies, against what are often regarded as Socratic dog-mas. Though this discovery does not commit us to defining any one version of Socrates as the historical or even the Platonic Socrates, the plurality of Socratic versions is a possibility that Plato himself may have wanted us to see.
Although this article primarily attempts an interpretation of the Euthydemus, this interpretation entails the supposition that Socratic elenchus relies on the interlocutor's willingness to engage in genuine self-reflection. 18. Clay 1994 discusses the literary appropriation of the historical Socrates. 19. Cf. Long 1996a and 1996b for an account of the Socratic schools in Hellenistic philosophy. Later, we shall see that the Euthydemus has Socrates combatting eristic and logic-chopping in favor of moral exhortation, in a way that recalls both Aristo and the Cynics (for Aristo, cf. Long 1996, 22, and on Aristo as a critic of ethical theorizing, see Porter 1996) . 20. For these aspects of Cynicism as it manifests itself in Rome, see Griffin 1996 . 21. In this article I do not have room to address the question of how the Socratic precepts are tied in to the elenchus. Most scholars agree that Socrates avers the truth of these precepts at least partially on the grounds that they remain undefeated in elenctic arguments. Furthermore, Socrates thinks that all people will agree to these same precepts, given time to reflect about them and despite their initial protestations to the contrary. Why is it that these precepts alone arise from the elenchus as indefeasible moral truths?
Self-inquiry-a fundamentally nondogmatic practice-is the basis of the Socratic elenchus, which is not (at least in the Euthydemus
While Socrates' interlocutors nearly always defer to Socrates' brand of virtue-centered eudaimonism, experience confirms that conflicts between virtue and self-interest are inevitable. Scholars have tried to explain the compliance of Socrates' interlocutors in several ways. Irwin 1995, 63, has suggested that, in the end, Socrates must rely on the self-evidence of the proposition that virtue always benefits the person who possesses it. Brickhouse and Smith 1994, 73-102, following Vlastos, suggest that for success in the elenchus Socrates relies upon a latent but universally held belief system that equates with his own views.
22. On the Euthydemus as foundational for a supposed system of Socratic ethics, see Irwin 1995, 48-65. Irwin applies an Aristotelian analysis to the primacy of wisdom thesis developed in the Euthydemus, and so raises puzzles about the relative weight of various external goods as components or sufficient conditions for happiness. In this article, I emphasize the origins of the elenchus in self-inquiry, rather than as a foundation for a systematic ethical philosophy.
23. On the connections between the elenchus and self-knowledge see Griswold 1989, 7-8.
This orientation, self-inquiry, is revealed in many of the dialogue's most telling images and is blatantly announced by the interlocutor least likely to embrace it, when Dionysodorus asks Socrates, "Tell me, do you think you know what belongs to yourself?" (301e6). Formally, the dialogue's relentless sophisms, as we will shortly see, turn on fallacies of predication, on identities that are misplaced, or falsely attributed to inappropriate subjects.24 Taken together, these fallacies make for an annoying read even if they do hold some kind of dialectical interest. Dionysodorus and Euthydemus rehearse their mistakes but fail to gain ground in transmitting the art of refutation. Why does Plato bother us with these quibbling siblings?
To use fallacies in order to gain an unfair dialectical advantage is the primary tactic of those who practice antilogia. No doubt Socrates went out of his way to distinguish his own methods from the disputational technai practiced by some of his contemporaries, and no doubt Plato is jealous of the Socratic reputation, refusing to allow it to fall into the wrong hands.25 However, the sophisms in this dialogue also assist in the development of its central theme, which involves locating, defining, or predicating the self. Dionysodorus and Euthydemus are not just guilty of technical errors in the realm of logic; they also go seriously astray in their attempts at self-definition. combat against practitioners of antilogia anticipated the Antisthenean motto, reported by Diogenes, according to which (6.104): "those who have achieved self-mastery can dispense with learning literature, lest they be distracted by matters that do not pertain to them (aXXotpiotq)." In this quotation, Antisthenes' rejection of traditional education exactly mirrors the Socratic revolt against Sophistic education represented throughout the dialogue.33
FROM "YOUR FATHER IS A DOG" TO FATHER OF THE DOGS
These Antisthenean trademarks, the denial of contradiction and the tuphomachia, are easy to recognize and difficult to account for. Why does Plato toss in allusions to Antisthenes and how do they serve the dialogue's philosophical and artistic ends? Readers who recognize these rather obvious allusions are now in a position to read some of the less transparent material with greater appreciation. In fact, I will go on to argue that the dialogue is rife with allusions to Antisthenes in particular, as well as Cynic motifs in general.34 Perhaps it is the very ludic or (to use a more properly Cynic tag) serio-comic quality of these references that underscores the Cynic themes of the dialogue. In the nineteenth century, students of the dialogue tried to read it as forming part of the ongoing literarische Fehden, or disputes between rival schools, operating in Plato's own day.35 If in the Euthydemus Plato invokes a literary genre such as the spoudaio-geloion, in this most comic of Plato's works it is in keeping with its proto-Cynic subtext. From the outset, Plato suggests that the sight of Socrates, at his advanced age, taking lessons from the two recently educated brothers36 will be a comedy, and his first lesson begins with their giggles as they admit that they really "aren't serious" about legal affairs.
In the Euthydemus Plato seems to be meditating on Socratic philosophy and its various (mis)recognitions. Present-day scholars who engage in Socratic reconstruction may or may not have recourse to works outside the Platonic corpus in formulating their versions of Socrates.37 Likewise, we are entitled to imagine that Plato himself was aware that Socrates in his own day was a controversial figure, easy to misconstrue, whose conversations could and did give rise to various, often conflicting, interpretations.38 Plato tolerated the notion that people of differing intellectual bents inhabited the 33. On Antisthenes' views on education see Brancacci 1992, 4061-63, and idem 1990, 85-118. 34. Some of the allusions are more far-fetched or admit of greater doubt than the Antisthenean signatures discussed above. At times, the reader is hard pressed to decide whether one is encountering a somewhat less pointed allusion or a strange coincidence. For example, the dialogue's opening words, Ti; niv, are very much related to Antisthenes' formula for a definition, as reported by Diogenes (6.3.1): k6yoq -cTtlv 6 OT6 Ti TV fi ioct 6T1&ov.
Another example of the more doubtful kind of allusion is the statement that wisdom can be taught, at Euthydemus 282c (i ao(pia 6ia6TO6v), which could be compared to Diogenes' report concerning Antisthenean maxims. Diogenes (6.10) includes i6aiTcv nE65EiKvuE Thv dpEnTv ("he used to demonstrate that virtue can be taught" It is just this mythology surrounding Socratic genealogy that the playful sequence, "your father is a dog," is intended to capture. We return for the moment to Antisthenes. It turns out that fatherlessness also has a cultic significance of possible relevance for our dialogue. In his Life of Antisthenes (6.13), Diogenes Laertius records the now almost universally rejected scholastic succession of the Cynic-Stoic branch of the Socratic family: Socrates, Antisthenes, Diogenes, Crates, Zeno.41
He used to hold discussions in the gymnasium at Cynosarges not far from the gates, whence some [conclude] that the Cynic school derived its name from that district .. And he was the first, Diocles tells us, to double his cloak and be content with that one garment and to take up a staff and a wallet. 43. For details of this decree, including dating, copying, and documentation, see Billot 1993, 79-80 and the references she cites. In particular see the work of Humphreys 1976. I do not wish to get too embroiled in the legalistic details of exactly what kind of nothoi are referred to both in this decree and, more generally, in association with Cynosarges. A passage from Demosthenes suggests, at any rate, that nothos could denote both one whose mother was not an Athenian citizen (metroxenos-the standard form of nothos after the decree of Pericles) and also perhaps one whose father was not an Athenian citizen, but whose mother in fact was, or a patroxenos (Contra Aristocratem 213).
Cynosarges was in the district
44. "The priest will complete the monthly sacrifice together with the parasitoi. These will be chosen from among the nothoi and their sons according to ancestral custom. Action will be brought before the court concerning those who do not wish to be parasitoi" (Polemon F78 Preller apud Athenaeus 234e). On the activities of the nothoi in Cynosarges, see Ogden 1995, 199-202 your opinion do human beings carry justice in their purses or in their souls?' 'In their souls,' he replied. 'And yet how is it that you make them more just in their souls by putting silver in their purses?"' (SSR VA 81-83). In our example, the gilded skulls of the Scythians are infinitely preferable to the inconvenience of lugging around gold in one's body, but the example begins to play upon a Cynic tenet, and this is the oikeion/allotrion distinction, to which we now turn.
OIKEION/ALLOTRION
Already we have seen that Plato anticipates the Stoic doctrine of adiaphora in the Euthydemus:56 "in all these things we said at first were good, our account is not that they are in themselves good by nature, but the position, it seems, is as follows. If ignorance controls them, they are greater bads than their opposites" (281d By studying this contrast, we can begin to understand some of the Socratic paradoxes explored in the Euthydemus. For example, though Socrates argues that wisdom is the only inherently good thing, at 291c-292d, he sets out as a criterion for this wisdom that it can have no utility (292d3): "It must not be a manufacturer of any of those products that are neither good nor bad, and it must not transmit any knowledge, except itself." Just as Antisthenes taught that the wise person should learn to discriminate between the self and what is alien, so Socrates suggests that this wisdom he is in search of is self-knowledge.
SELF-PREDICATION IN THE EUTHYDEMUS
It comes as no surprise that self-scrutiny features heavily in the images and allusions of the Euthydemus. After all, the dialogue purports to pit Socratic wisdom against the various alternatives70 for higher education in Athens, a very common feature of Socratic dialogues (e.g., Alcibiades 1, Gorgias, Protagoras, Hippias Major). In these dialogues, Socratic elenchus is counterposed against sophistic logographia or eristic, as the case may be. Selfinquiry, the demand for an account of one's life, is the pivot of the elenchus; the Euthydemus, exceptionally, alludes constantly to this dimension of Socratic teaching, without in fact displaying the elenchus.
A Here Plato chooses a humorous ploy to underscore Socrates' associations with the search for an authentic self, one that lurks behind the scenes, listening and checking up on Socrates' elenctic conversations. Later in the dialogue (Hp. Mai. 301el-10) Plato introduces the same topic as part of a digression on predication. Quantitative predicates cannot, while qualitative predicates can, range freely over an indefinite number of subjects. For example, Socrates proceeds to ask, "Are we both one, you and I, or are you two and I two?" This banter about persons being one or two, odd or even, continues to thematize the Socratic search for self. Hippias, when he wants to show what the fine really is, plots the career of a bodily self that should ideally end, as he tells us, with "a decent burial": "In all cases the finest thing for every man is to be wealthy, healthy, honored by the Greeks, having attained to a ripe old age ... finally to be buried by his offspring in a magnificent fashion" (Hp. Mai. 29 lel). Socrates' puzzles about the structure of subjectivity extend to a scrutiny of the affective self. During the elenchus, habits of thought, emotional reactions, and entrenched opinions begin to surface: Hippias reveals his fondness for pretty women, fine horses, and lots of money 70. Although the major contender against Socratic wisdom is eristic, Socrates' interludes with Crito, in which he briefly dismisses logographia, the art of making speeches for others (289d and 305), seem to suggest that higher education as training in rhetoric is also under attack.
(288a-c5). These attachments indicate something about the structure of Hippias' personal desires as well as about the locus of value in the community to which he belongs. Once aware that he has these values, Hippias becomes free to question their authenticity. In his encounter with Socrates, he is required to display a certain amount of detachment from his passions, states of mind, and desires, and to notice their contingency upon a set of unquestioned assumptions. The aporetic structure of self-inquiry derives first and foremost from this radical detachment from the personal that emerges in the process of elenchus.
During the course of their conversation, Socrates manages to refine Hippias' conception of the fine, distracting Hippias from his inexhaustible catalogue of beautiful objects. In suggesting that aesthetic pleasures, "pleasures through hearing or seeing" (299a-300b 1), are the locus of beauty, Socrates brings beauty inside the world of experience, and not outside of the person. Although this definition is resisted through the influence of Socrates' alter ego,71 this formulation bears some resemblance to the "inner wealth" and the gold on the inside of the head that we earlier encountered among the Cynics.
In any And yet it is just this failure to distinguish between accidental and essential predicates that shows up in several of the sophisms in the Euthydemus. Recall that we saw one instance above of what Aristotle calls "fallacies connected with accident" (Soph. el. 166b28), where "father" is accidentally predicated of two distinct individuals. In another instance, we find Socrates agreeing that "whatever possesses a soul" is a living being (Euthydemus 302bl) and that those living beings over which he exercises property rights are said to be his. In this case, "being alive" is an essential predicate of "living being," while "belonging to a given owner" is accidental. Failure to observe this distinction results in Socrates being forced to claim that he exercises property rights over the civic gods.
Here the series of logical fallacies that create the opportunity for the dialogue to explore a number of Socratic theses (as we saw above, e.g., in 75 In the dialogue, no answer is forthcoming. Socrates tries to point the brothers in the right direction for deepening their search, as when he mentions the soul (287) or when he extols wisdom and renounces external goods. But his hints are continually set aside as the brothers insist that "one's own" must be detachable property, that the word "mine" indicates a proprietary relationship with other objects. Self-predication (not just the Platonic question of whether the Beautiful is beautiful, but perhaps also the Cynic question of how to circumscribe the self) is the central theme of the dialogue, and failures in correct self-predication are the causes of both the logical and ethical errors committed by Dionysodorus and Euthydemus.
We saw above that Antisthenes explores a number of paradoxes associated with predication: is all true predication just tautology; is definition possible; are essential attributes distinguishable from accidental attributes; is an exhaustive description of an individual the only way to achieve unambiguous reference?79 In many of these paradoxes, the quest for the oikeion, as an appropriate description or designation for a (possibly) extra-semantic entity is central. How does the subject of all our identity statements, those that begin "I am . . ." become adequately realized in the various predicates used to complete these statements? Part of the question for Antisthenes may be a search into the difficulties of how linguistic representation of the self is in any way possible. But that topic must be left for another occasion.
Overall the dialogue succeeds in showing us only what is not oikeionit is evidently not the body or any of its possessions, nor is it any of the other so-called goods that appear on Socrates' initial list. Perhaps, as in Letter 9 of Anacharsis with its parable of the empty ship floating without hindrance down the Danube, the very point of the dialogue is to emphasize this inability to locate the self. It is precisely the Cynic refusal to set up an oikos, or rather as we saw in Herodotus, the nomadic ability to carry one's oikos, that provides an explanation for what is left unsaid in the Euthydemus. One is reminded of the negative terms deployed by the Cynics to express their moral philosophy: "adiaphoria, atuphia, apatheia .. ."80 This failure to define the self, to itemize its constituents so as to capture uniquely that which belongs to the self and that which does not, has a particular interest for the student of Antisthenes. Such students will recall Antisthenes' puzzle over definition cited above: "to the effect that you cannot define what a thing is, 'for a definition is a long logos,' though you can teach what it is like." Although self-knowledge, or as Socrates puts it, knowledge that imparts "no knowledge but itself alone" (292d), is valorized in the Euthydemus, it finally eludes the one person who could be expected to have it: "We are just as far from knowing, or farther, what is that knowledge that will make us happy" (297e5). Antisthenes is often thought to have held that every meaningful statement is an identity statement; the converse of this strict requirement is that no statement about the self can fully circumscribe it. The virtue that Antisthenes likens to an impregnable fortress, self-knowledge, if it purports to be a discursive and exhaustive knowledge of what does and does not belong to the self, will obviously prove elusive. But does not the Euthydemus precisely engage the reader in this fantasy of a kind of universal knowledge, both in Socrates' speculations about a knowledge that can impart happiness and in the brothers' fantastic claims-"Then you know everything, since you know something" (294al)-about the knower who knows all things before he is even born?81 This universal knowledge, in which language employs a lexicon that is an exact representation of every extralinguistic item, is not confined to the linguistic paradoxes explored in the Euthydemus. In the Socratic meditation on the knowledge that makes all human beings happy and in the eristic parody of this knowledge, we see traces of Antisthenes' theory of language. The oikeios logos, whether we construe it as a complete discursive mapping of the network of meanings, or as an exhaustive description of an extralinguistic reality, translates, in Hellenistic philosophy, into the unattainable rationality of the Stoic sage, while the autonomy that such a map would provide the sage approaches the Cynic idea of absolute self-reliance or independence.
CONCLUSION: SOCRATES AND THE CYNICS
What, after all, are we to make of the fact that certain Cynic icons appear in this dialogue-Heracles, Antisthenes, Scythian Nomads, and, finally, dogs? The convergence of all these themes in a single dialogue is perhaps too great to be a coincidence, given what we have come to expect from Plato's works of art. Yet it would be much too simplistic to claim that Plato here adumbrates Antisthenean theses or presents a mere tableau of Cynic placita. Nor do I advocate a return to the nineteenth century's pursuit of "Antisthenes sightings" in every Platonic dialogue. But if the Euthydemus presents evidence that Plato associates the Socratic philosopher Antisthenes with the Cynics or even regards him as the father of the dogs, then we must see this dialogue as helping to write the history of Socratic philosophy. All too often scholars who work on Socrates seize on self-consistency as the primary goal of the elenchus; and so, with this goal of self-consistency in mind they perhaps approach the Platonic Socrates looking for precisely this quality, attempting to recreate, if not the historical Socrates, then at least a monolithic Platonic Socrates. But there is no reason to think that Plato intended to portray a singular Socrates (after all, in the Hippias Major, Socrates speaks 81. Of course, phrasing it this way makes it sound like the theory of recollection, but there is not the space to pursue this comparison.
